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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre-war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and immediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.